International Journal of Transpersonal Studies
Volume 33

Issue 1

Article 8

1-1-2014

Results of a Transpersonal, Narrative, and Phenomenological
Psychotherapy for Psychosis
Lewis Mehl-Madrona
Coyote Institute for Studies in Change and Transformation

Erik Jul
Coyote Institute for Studies in Change and Transformation

Barbara Mainguy
Coyote Institute for Studies in Change and Transformation

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ciis.edu/ijts-transpersonalstudies
Part of the Alternative and Complementary Medicine Commons, Philosophy Commons, Psychology
Commons, and the Religion Commons

Recommended Citation
Mehl-Madrona, L., Jul, E., & Mainguy, B. (2014). Mehl-Madrona, L., Jul, E., & Mainguy, B. (2014). Results of
a transpersonal, narrative, and phenomenological psychotherapy for psychosis. International Journal of
Transpersonal Studies, 33(1), 57–76.. International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 33 (1).
http://dx.doi.org/10.24972/ijts.2014.33.1.57

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.
This Special Topic Article is brought to you for free and open access by International Journal of Transpersonal
Studies. It has been accepted for inclusion in International Journal of Transpersonal Studies by an authorized
administrator. For more information, please contact the editors.

Results of a Transpersonal, Narrative,
and Phenomenological Psychotherapy for Psychosis
Lewis Mehl-Madrona

Erik Jul

Barbara Mainguy

Coyote Institute for Studies in Change and Transformation
Augusta, ME, USA

In our academically based, psychiatric outpatient practice, we have encountered those
who wish to avoid medications for treatment for psychosis. This study is a qualitative/
quantitative study in progress of a patient population diagnosed with psychosis and
managed primarily without medication. We reflect upon the transpersonal foundations
of an approach in which voices and visions are accepted as real, given full ontological
status, and addressed within a dialogical framework. We present interim data on a series
of 51 patients over 20 years old who presented with psychosis and who remained with us
for at least six months in their effort to reduce or eliminate medication. (An additional
201 patients presented themselves for treatment but did not continue for six months.) The
practitioners use questionnaires to quantify symptom level, including the Brief Psychiatric
Rating Scale, Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale, two depression rating scales, the
Clinical Global Inventory, and the Revised Behavior and Symptom Identification Scale.
In addition, narrative interviews are utilized in a review of symptoms. Of these 51
individuals, 38 managed psychosis without the use of medication (or with very occasional
medication as sleeping assist). Another nine managed well on low dose medications.
Three individuals required higher levels of medication and one became progressively
worse despite all efforts and was eventually involuntarily placed in the State Hospital. The
overall cost-benefit is favorable in creating fewer hospitalization, crises, and diminished
suicidality. The results do not hint at one algorithmic solution, but suggest the need for
individualized approaches that are client-centered and build upon the previous successes
of the person, enroll family and friends in a community effort, and collaborate with
those communities to apply those approaches desired by the people themselves. We are
optimistic that this dialogical approach to psychosis in which lived experience is granted
full ontological reality can facilitate recovery of function in the ordinary, consensual
world. Each person’s narrative is unique and not necessarily transferable to any other
person. How people arrive at successful solutions is varied and makes sense only within
their local context and knowledge communities.
Keywords: Psychosis, voice hearers, narrative, transpersonal, phenomenological
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ntil recently, psychiatric practice has tended to
label the lived experiences of people diagnosed
with psychosis as meaningless hallucinations or
delusions. Increasingly, however, different perspectives,
including that of voice hearers themselves, have
prompted clinicians to wonder whether they might be
legitimate experiences in consciousness with their own
ontological validity. Responsible psychiatric practice
means attending to increasing evidence for the limits and
dangers of psychotropic medications. To use medications

as front line and ongoing treatment means to ignore a
host of studies that have pointed out limitations in their
effectiveness (e.g. Schooler, Goldberg, Boothe, & Cole,
1967; Leff, 1992; Gur et al., 1998; Harrow, 2007). Good
health outcomes have been achieved differently through
recent alternatives such as the Maastricht Approach
(Corstens et al., 2009), the Finnish psychosis project and
the initiative of Working for Recovery, a Scottish recovery
house model. More, there has been a recent resurgence
of interest in Loren Mosher’s Soteria houses, a re-
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examination of the Joseph Burke/RD Laing experimental
milieu, as well as a greater investment in the possibilities
of narrative approaches, which has meant an increase
in hope for a fledgling recovery model of well being for
those who experience psychosis. With the understanding
that 1% of the world’s population hears voices, and that
the management of these voices is possible and has been
achieved by a growing number of people, symptoms and
their management can be regarded in a different way,
leading to more encouraging goals.
In addition, the first author of this study,
Lewis Mehl-Madrona, worked with John Weir Perry in
San Francisco and met him as a supervisor during his
psychiatric residency. Perry encouraged psychotherapy
with psychosis and had a prescient understanding of the
discouraging effects of medicating too soon (J. W. Perry,
personal communication, 1982).
We present another approach to managing
symptoms and sustaining quality of life with the kinds
of symptoms that conventionally receive a diagnosis
of schizophrenia. In our case, we have undertaken an
inquiry into a transpersonal approach, which recalls
Stan Grof ’s spiritual emergency model, but which
owes its roots more philosophically and practically
to a construct of mind and consciousness found in
indigenous thinking.
We introduce a transpersonal model that rests
upon a belief that the contents of consciousness have
value, whether or not one can understand them, and that
extraordinary experiences point toward extraordinary
realities that are worthy of serious consideration and
further exploration.
Our dialogic, transpersonal
approach positions these experiences as valid and
potentially informative about possible worlds beyond
ordinary reality. The treatment narrative we use parallels
the story we tell about consciousness and reported
transcendental realms–what are they and what can
they tell us? The belief in the validity of the contents of
consciousness takes one from a materialistic perspective
on mind and mental health toward the realm of the
psychosocial and the existential where what a person says
and experiences makes sense in the world in which they
are embedded. In this paper we present one way of many
in which a psychotherapy for psychosis is developing
from this perspective, from mutual engrossment by
practitioner and voice hearer in the phenomenology
of the experience, understood dialogically through a
continual conversation of clarification and liberation,
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which becomes, finally, a coherent understanding of the
experience, and allows for transcendence to the shared
healing of peers who have been equally wounded. We
share some of the outcomes of this work.
Theories of Consciousness.
ameroff and Penrose (2013) distinguished three
broad categories of theories about consciousness
and its contents. In the science/materialist view,
they say, consciousness has no distinctive role:
“Consciousness is not an independent quality but arose,
in terms of conventional physical processes, as a natural
evolutionary consequence of the biological adaptation
of brains and nervous systems” (Hameroff & Penrose,
2014, p. 95). Chalmers (2012) opined that consciousness
is epiphenomenal, lacking independent influence on
matter with its holder having the illusory belief that it
matters. In this view, consciousness is not an intrinsic
feature of the universe. This would be the stance of
much of contemporary psychiatry, and would allow one
to ignore the visions and voices of psychosis as so much
ranting and raving of a disturbed brain, entirely lacking
in meaning and content.
The second broad category suggested by
Hameroff and Penrose (2014) is embodied in the
views of Descartes in which “consciousness is a
separate quality, distinct from physical actions and not
controlled by physical laws, that has always been in the
universe” (p. 95). This follows from Kant’s (1781/1998)
suggestion that consciousness can causally influence
physical matter and human behavior, but has no basis
or description in science. In this position, consciousness
lies outside of science. Some transpersonal theories fall
into this category, though many would ultimately prefer
to see science and spirituality linked.
In the third category, “consciousness results
from discrete physical events; such events have always
existed in the universe as non-cognitive, proto-conscious
events, these acting as part of precise physical laws not
yet fully understood. Biology evolved a mechanism to
orchestrate such events and to couple them to neuronal
activity, resulting in meaningful, cognitive, conscious
moments and hence also to causal control of behavior”
(Hameroff & Penrose, 2014, p. 96). Hameroff and
Penrose proposed that the moments in which this
happens are moments in which the quantum wave
equation is reduced through self-measurement into
a single state. In this theory, the Penrose-Hameroff
theory of orchestrated objective reduction, moments
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of consciousness occur as terminations of quantum
computations in brain microtubules, grounding us as
humans into one consensual reality and its experiential
qualities. Consciousness is an intrinsic feature of the
action of the universe and has a legitimate scientific basis
for being simultaneously non-physical and grounded in
a world of brains.
For those who agree with Penrose and
Hameroff, changing the contents of consciousness
should change brain structure and function. Schwartz
(2003) demonstrated this using functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) for the psychotherapy
of obsessive-compulsive disorder. Changes in mind
reliably and predictably preceded changes in brain
structure and function. We believe that the brains of
people with psychosis (and we wonder about dementia)
can be mitigated through a psychotherapeutic process
that modulates the contents of consciousness and how
these are processed and organized. In Penrose and
Hameroff’s idea of quantum superposition, the quantum
wave equation contains all possibilities, but when a
measurement is taken or an observation made, it is
possible to see only one. They have suggested that one
can oscillate among a variety of actual states, but some
have more energy and are more entangled with other
aspects of the environment and are more probable to be
realized and experienced than others.
For a variety of reasons (trauma, drugs, spiritual
journeying without a map), people with psychosis may
alter those energies and probabilities and find themselves
experiencing other actualizations and possible worlds
than what are considered consensual by the rest of
society. In this way, these individuals may be seen more
as adventurers in quantum reality than as patients with
diseased brains. Problems arise, however, when awareness
becomes “stuck” in these other realities, or when these
persons find themselves perceiving other realities while
existing in this one. In such situations they become
unable to reality test in conventionally expected ways.
From this point of view, the contents and
descriptions given by people with psychosis become
fascinating accounts of journeys through time and space
that many are too grounded in the mundane world to
experience. As indigenous elders have put it, those with
psychosis go journeying for the rest of us to worlds that
we may not want to visit, and they bring back important
messages, which they themselves cannot necessarily
decipher. That decoding is left to others to realize.

Results of a Psychotherapy for Psychosis

We have found that it is possible to accept
the validity of the realities experienced by people
with psychosis, and to explore ways to integrate those
experiences and dimensions that allow for management
of the quotidian tasks of life. This approach celebrates
the uniqueness and value of their visions, but also calls
their attention to the importance of being able to manage
instrumental activities such as shopping, cooking,
cleaning, and so forth.
Despite being actively practiced by a growing
range of practitioners (Fenton, 2000; see the listserve
and website of the International Society for the
Psychotherapy of Schizophrenia [ISPS]), psychotherapy
for schizophrenia is not commonly mentioned in
the psychiatric literature except as a loosely defined,
supportive case management task (e.g., Wolff et al.,
1997), or as a control condition in studies of other
interventions (e.g., Hogarty et al., 1997). Many people
who have been diagnosed with schizophrenia do report
that psychotherapy was helpful (Coursey, Keller, &
Farrell, 1995; Hatfield, Gearson, & Coursey, 1996). Case
studies (Lysaker & France, 1999; Lysaker & Lysaker,
in press) and some quantitative research (Glass et al.,
1989; Gunderson et al., 1984) also show benefits from
psychotherapy. Schooler, Keith, Severe, & Matthews
(1995) concluded that family treatment provided benefits
beyond other psychosocial interventions or usual care,
but that there was no evidence for differences in efficacy
among family treatments.
Limits of the
Materialist Approach to Psychosis
eliance on a materialist model may explain the lack
of emphasis on non-pharmacological approaches.
If consciousness is epiphenomenal, then changes to
consciousness would not change brain structure and
function. Despite Schwartz and a developing literature
on neuroplasticity (Doidge, 2012), adventures into the
implications of new understandings happen slowly.
The pharmaceutical approach has been much
critiqued in recent years, and became a highly public
conversation with the advent of a comprehensive review
of clinical work undertaken by Robert Whitaker (2002,
2004, 2005, 2007, 2011). In 2002, Whitaker published
Mad in America, a thoroughly researched account of
treatment for mental illness in the United States. In it,
he drew attention to controversy around the reporting
of studies using neuroleptics, and the continued
pressure to employ pharmaceutical interventions. In his
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“Timeline for neuroleptics” (2004, pp. 11-12), and in the
Whitaker Affidavit (2007), prepared for the Law Project
for Psychiatric Rights to assist in human rights cases
launched by self-named psychiatric survivors, Whitaker
outlined the case against neuroleptics. Whitaker began
with the common understanding that the modern drugcentered era began in the 1950s with the introduction
of chlorpromazine. By 1954 chlorpromazine was
found to induce symptoms of Parkinson’s disease. In
1962, the California Mental Hygiene Department
determined that chlorpromazine and other neuroleptics
prolonged hospitalization instead of reducing it, but in
1963, a six-week National Institute of Mental Health
Psychopharmacology Service Center Collaborative
Study Group (NIMH; 1964) collaborative study
concluded that chlorpromazine was a safe and effective
anti-schizophrenic drug. Efficacy in the short run
meant it was potent and effective in removing positive
symptoms so that clients became more manageable. A
conteoraneous NIMH efficacy study indicated at the end
of six weeks, 75% of patients treated with neuroleptics
were “much improved” or “very much improved” as
compared to 23% of the placebo patients (Cole, Klerman,
& Goldberg, 1964).
Just one year later, these same drugs were found
to impair learning in humans and animals, potentially
making it more difficult for socially ostracized people to
learn how to build healthy relationships (Deniker, 1990).
A one-year NIMH collaborative study found that drugtreated patients were more likely than placebo-treated
patients to be re-hospitalized (Schooler et al., 1967). In a
1968 withdrawal study (Prien), researchers at the NIMH
found that higher dosages received before drug cessation
were associated with higher relapse rates. Additionally,
a 1992 review by the World Health Organization (Leff,
1992) found that those with first break psychosis who live
in countries where they were not able to go to a hospital
and receive neuroleptics were more likely to recover and
less likely to require further hospitalization.
From early on such results raised concerns that
neuroleptics might have the potential to make individuals
more biologically vulnerable to psychosis over the long
run (Schooler et al., 1967). This finding and possibility
has been supported by further NIMH studies and implied
in World Health Organization studies (Jablensky et al.,
1992). It appears an alteration in the dopamine system
may leave patients with psychosis super-sensitized to
dopamine, the neurotransmitter believed to mediate the
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brain circuitry involved in psychotic events (Chouinard
& Jones, 1980; Chouinard, Jones, & Annale, 1978).
While criticism of these treatments has
continued to the present (e.g., Whitaker, 2004; Thomas
et al., 2014), there nevertheless remains a strong tendency
to medicate the first break with neuroleptics to curb
acute psychotic symptoms. The individual experiencing
the psychotic break becomes more manageable with
decreased positive symptoms. Yet in addition to the
concern that neuroleptics may sensitize individuals with
psychosis to have further breaks in the future, there are
also numerous other side effects associated with these
drugs such as weight gain, constipation, blurred vision,
confusion, and poor memory. By 1992, a neurolepticinduced deficit syndrome was recognized. In addition to
parkinsonism, akathisia, blunted emotions, and tardive
dyskinesia, patients treated with neuroleptics suffered
from increased incidence of blindness, fatal emboli,
arrhythmia, heat stroke, gynecomastia, galactorrhea,
obesity, sexual dysfunction, blood dyscrasias, skin
disorders, seizures, and early death.
In an often-cited 1994 Harvard study,
investigators found that schizophrenia outcomes in the
United States were no better than in the first decades
of the 20th century and had become worse during the
twenty years preceding the study (Hegarty, Baldessarini,
Tohen, Waternaux & Oepen, 1994). In 1995, reported
relapse rates for schizophrenia patients treated with
neuroleptics, outside of study conditions, were found
to be above 80% in the two years following hospital
discharge, much higher than pre-neuroleptic relapse rates
(Whitaker, 2004). In 1998, Gur et al. conducted MRI
studies and discovered neuroleptic-induced hypertrophy
of the caudate nucleus, the putamen, and the thalamus,
and atrophy of the frontal and temporal lobe, associated
with greater severity of both negative and positive
symptoms. In 1998, Harvard scientists concluded that
oxidative stress could be the process through which
neuroleptics cause neuronal damage in the brain (Tsai,
1998). In that same year, treatment with two or more
neuroleptics was found to increase risk of early death
(Joukamaa, 2006; Morgan, 2003).
Another concern raised discussed the limits of
testing antipsychotics. Most clinical trials are brief and
are aimed for obtaining approval for marketing from the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and these brief
trials may not reflect long-term results (Rosenheck, Swartz,
& Lieberman, 2006). In recognition of this, NIMH
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initiated practical clinical trials (PCTs), characterized
by large diverse and representative samples, prolonged
treatment, and practical treatment options. Several of
these PCTs (especially the Clinical Antipsychotic Trials
in the Intervention Effectiveness or CATIE) focused on
schizophrenia and evaluated treatment with first- and
second-generation antipsychotics (McEvoy et al., 2006;
Stroup et al., 2006). These longitudinal studies found
that the effectiveness and acceptability of antipsychotic
drugs varied considerably across the various presentations
of chronic schizophrenia. A separate study, in rural
China, revealed that low doses of medication were as
effective as high doses with significantly fewer side effects
(Cun, Shinfuku, Bertolote, Bailly-Salin, & Gittelman,
2006). Older medications, largely discarded in wealthier
countries, were as effective as newer, expensive antipsychotic drugs.
Medications proved to be far from the hopedfor chemical solution, and instead were associated with
many side-effects, undesirable outcomes, and a growing
concern from practitioners and consumers that they
might be doing as much or more harm than good.
Psychosocial Approaches to Psychosis
ur practice is one in a long tradition of psychosocial
approaches to psychosis that have continued
quietly alongside the strictly pharmaceutical practice.
Others have provided a comprehensive review of models
of psychosocial intervention, especially Mosher (1999).
We will therefore aim rather to show the path through
which our approach evolved. We trace the origins of
our thinking about psychosis to Laing, Perry, Mosher,
Lehninnen and the Finnish Psychosis Project, and to
indigenous elders.
We are aware of Stanislav Grof’s work on
spiritual emergencies, and feel his approach is useful
and consistent with our understanding that people who
have experienced some form of sudden connection to a
spiritual world may find it unnerving. We certainly feel
that venturing into that dimension of consciousness
unguided can be overwhelming and create a crisis. We
are not sure, however, that he would explain the realms
he understands in the way we would, nor that he would
grant full ontological status to beings encountered in
another realm. For that awareness, we are more influenced
by indigenous culture and practice. We are aware of
Julian Silverman’s (1967) writings on shamanism and
psychosis. Many indigenous people in North American
have objected to his description of North American

O

cultures as primitive, reflecting an anthropological
perspective that they consider prejudicial and out of
date. He described the shaman’s experience as abnormal,
though concluded that the shaman’s reconstitution of
self after this abnormal experience was a tribute to the
power of surrounding community with the experience
of the schizophrenic reflecting the negative view of
society toward the experience. He said, “Implicit in
this formulation is the following basic assumption: the
often noted overt similarities between the psychoticlike behaviors of marginally adjusted shamans and of
acute schizophrenics reflect even more basic identities
in the cognitive processes that generate these behaviors”
(Silverman, 1967, p. 21). However, contemporary research
points toward the healer in such communities as being
the most stable, instead of marginally adjusted. To
cultivate an experience of other worlds and to have it
thrust upon one are quite different experiences. Implicit
in everything we do is an acceptance of the realm of
the transpersonal and its contents, and our framework
for understanding the phenomenology of the psychotic
experience is grounded in this understanding.
With sensitivity to the felt sense of psychosis,
Laing (1967) and his colleagues at Kingsley Hall in
London generated ideas about how “a community-based,
supportive, protective, normalizing environment might
facilitate reintegration without hospitalization” (Mosher,
1999, pp. 143-144). Mosher (1999) brought this to the
United States in order to create a place that challenged
the assumptions, and as he put it, the “degredation, the
induction and perpetuation of powerlessness, unnecessary
dependency” (p. 144) that he saw in a medical model
belief system. Central to these efforts was the acceptance
and validation of the lived experiences of the clients.
Mosher (1999) reflected that he was drawn to
the “phenomenologic/existential thinkers” (e.g., Allers,
Boss, Hegel, Husserl, Sartre, and Tillich) to create a more
open-minded, non-categorizing, no-preconceptions
approach to disturbed and disturbing persons. He
was also sensitive to the art of the “total institution”
(Goffman, 1961); he cited “the authoritarianism, the
degradation ceremonies, the induction and perpetuation
of powerlessness, unnecessary dependency, labeling,
and the primacy of institutional needs over those of
the people ostensibly served—the patients” (Mosher,
1999, p. 8). Power and its politics were always a part
of Mosher’s perspective, inspiring us to aspire for nonhierarchical services. Mosher (1999) wrote:
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Despite being trained by psychopharmacologic
icons (e.g., Dr. Gerald Klerman), I somehow never
found a Lazarus among those I treated with the
major tranquilizers. Again, my experience led me
to question the emerging psychopharmacologic
domination of the treatment of very disturbed and
disturbing persons. Actually those persons seemed
to appreciate my sometimes, clumsy attempts to
understand them and their lives. Because I hadn’t
found a large role for drugs in the helping process,
I was led to believe more in interpersonal than
neuroleptic “cures.” (p. 3)
Mosher refined Laing’s ideas to create the Soteria
Project, an alternative to hospitalization. This project’s
design was a random assignment, two-year follow-up
study comparing the Soteria method of treatment with
“usual” general hospital psychiatric ward interventions
for persons newly diagnosed as having schizophrenia
and deemed in need of hospitalization. It has been
extensively reported (see especially Mosher & Menn,
1978; Mosher, Vallone, & Menn, 1995). In addition to
less than 30 days previous hospitalization (i.e., “newly
diagnosed”), the Soteria study selected 18- to 30-year-old
unmarried subjects about whom three independent raters
could agree met DSM-2 criteria for schizophrenia and
who were experiencing at least four of seven Bleulerian
symptoms of the disorder. The early onset (18 to 30
years) and marital status criteria were designed to identify
a subgroup of persons diagnosed with schizophrenia who
were at statistically high risk for long-term disability.
Mosher described the Soteria method as the 24
hour a day application of interpersonal, phenomenological
interventions by a nonprofessional staff, usually without
drug treatment, in the context of a small, homelike, quiet,
supportive, protective, and tolerant social environment.
The core practice of interpersonal phenomenology
focused on the development of a nonintrusive, noncontrolling but actively empathetic relationship with
the psychotic person without having to do anything
explicitly therapeutic or controlling. He characterized
it as “being with,” “standing by attentively,” “trying to
put your feet into the other person’s shoes,” or “being
an LSD trip guide.” He aimed to develop, over time, a
shared experience of the meaningfulness of the client’s
individual social context—current and historical.
No formal therapeutic “sessions” occurred at Soteria.
Therapy took place there as staff built bridges, over
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time, between individuals’ emotionally disorganized
states to the life events that seemed to have precipitated
their psychological disintegration. The context within
the house was one of positive expectations that
reorganization and reintegration would occur as a
result of these seemingly minimalist interventions. This
context of expecting recovery proves powerful as we
are noticing in our current pain research (Mainguy &
Mehl-Madrona, 2013).
The original Soteria House opened in 1971.
A replication facility (“Emanon”) opened in 1974 in
another suburban San Francisco Bay Area city. The
project first published systematic one-year outcome data
in 1974 and 1975 (Mosher & Menn, 1974; Mosher,
Menn, & Matthews, 1975). Despite the publication of
consistently positive results (Mosher & Menn, 1978;
Matthews, Roper, Mosher, & Menn, 1979) for this
subgroup of newly diagnosed psychotic persons from the
first cohort of subjects (1971-1976), the Soteria Project
ended in 1983. Due to lack of funding, data from the
1976-1983 cohort were not analyzed until 1992.
Results were clear that alternatives to acute
psychiatric hospitalization are as, or more, effective
than traditional hospital care in short-term reduction of
psychopathology and longer social adjustment, especially
if the patient was without extensive hospitalization.
Patients with less than 30 days of hospitalization were
especially responsive to the positive therapeutic effects of
the well-defined, Soteria-type special social environment.
A number of approaches to treat psychosis
while minimizing medication have arisen in recent
years. The Finnish Psychosis Project emerged from the
work of Yriii Alanen and colleagues (Alanen, Lehtinen,
Lehtinen, Aaltonen, & Räkköläinen, 1999), which
minimizes medication and emphasizes teamwork,
basic psychotherapeutic attitude, family-centeredness
and need-specificity. Holma and Aaltonen (1998)
described a narrative understanding of acute psychoses
through hermeneutical premises. According to their
colleague Giddens (1993), this hermeneutical approach
is predicated on four premises:
1) An object has to be understood in its own terms,
that is, as a subject. The other has the authentic right
to take his or her role in a dialogue as a full and equal
partner. This is the premise of hermeneutical autonomy and guides our work with voices and the beings
behind those voices.
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2) An object has to be understood in context and it is
through this that meaningful coherence is generated.
Hence, we strive to understand the context of the being of the voice and the context in which our patient
has come to intersect with that being’s world.
3) Understanding has to conform to the actuality of
the experience of the interpreter, so-called pre-understanding. All understanding demands some measure of pre-understanding whereby further understanding becomes possible.
4) The interpretation of a human product or action
must be adequate in relation to the intentions of its
originator. Though we may question the conclusions
a person makes about the beings behind his or her
voices, we never question the validity of the person’s
experience.
Holma and Aaltonen (1998) constructed mutual
understanding through conversation with the individual
with psychosis. It was vital to their success that the patient
was brought into a dialogue where the meanings of the
events they experienced were socially co-constructed.
They asserted that diagnosis in the traditional way
seemed less essential in the treatment of psychosis than
understanding the individual’s situation through the
story he or she was telling through action and speech.
Consonant with Narrative Cognitive-Behavior Therapy
(NCBT), the individual should be taken as a valuable
participant in social relationships and not marginalized
as psychotic or sick. As Hippocrates said, it is more
important to understand the person who has the illness,
than to know what sort of illness the person has.
In 1997, Aaltonen and colleagues published
results of their approach. (Alanen et al., 1999). The
two-year outcome of two groups of consecutive
patients (total N = 106) with first-episode functional
non-affective psychosis was compared, both treated
according to the need-specific Finnish model, which
stressed teamwork, patient and family participation,
and basic psychotherapeutic attitudes. The two study
groups differed in the use of neuroleptics: three of
the sites (the experimental group) used a minimal
neuroleptic regime whilst the other three (the control
group) used neuroleptics according to the usual practice.
Total time spent in hospital, occurrence of psychotic
symptoms during the last follow-up year, employment,
GAS score and the Grip on Life assessment were used
as outcome measures. In the experimental group 42.9%
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of the patients did not receive neuroleptics at all during
the whole two-year period, while the corresponding
proportion in the control group was 5.9%. The overall
outcome of the whole group was favorable. The outcome
of the experimental group was equal or better than
that of the control group, after controlling for age,
gender, and diagnosis. This indicates that an integrated
approach, stressing intensive psychosocial measures, can
be recommended in the treatment of acute first-episode
psychosis.
Psychosis Outcomes
in Developing Countries
he World Health Organization’s International Pilot
Study on Schizophrenia commenced in 1967 to
establish whether or not schizophrenia could be found in
all countries and whether it could be reliably diagnosed
and treated. The study quickly affirmed that the diagnosis
could be made everywhere. Gradually, however, the
researchers noticed that patients in poor nations had
better outcomes than those in wealthier nations. This
led to a second study with more rigorous guidelines that
tracked about 3,300 patients with 30-year follow-ups in
12 countries—capitalist and communist, Eastern and
Western, Northern and Southern, large and small, rich
and poor. Again, patients in poorer countries spent fewer
days in hospitals, were more likely to be employed, and
were more socially connected (Ganev, Onchev, & Ivanov,
1998). Between half and two-thirds became symptomfree, whereas only about a third of patients from rich
countries recovered to the same degree (Sartorius, 1992).
Nigerian, Colombian, and Indian patients were less
likely to suffer relapses and had longer periods of health
in between. Doctors in poorer countries stopped drugs
when patients became better, whereas doctors in rich
countries often required patients to take medication all
their lives. Psychotic disorders have better prognoses in
developing countries, with higher remission rates
Vedantam, a journalist, wrote a series of articles
for the Washington Post in 2005, showcasing the results
of the World Health Organization’s schizophrenia study.
He shared this story:

T

Psychiatrist Naren Wig crossed an open sewer,
skirted a pond and, in the dusty haze of afternoon,
saw something miraculous. Krishna Devi, a woman
he had treated years ago for schizophrenia, sat in a
courtyard surrounded by religious pictures, exposed
brick walls and drying laundry. Devi had stopped
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taking medication long ago, but her articulate
speech and easy smile were eloquent testimony that
she had recovered from the debilitating disease. Few
schizophrenia patients in the United States are so
lucky, even after years of treatment. But Devi had
hidden assets: a doting family and an embracing
village that never excluded her from social events,
family obligations and work. Devi is a living
reminder of a remarkable three-decade-long study
by the World Health Organization—one that many
Western doctors initially refused to believe: People
with schizophrenia, a deadly illness characterized
by hallucinations, disorganized thinking and
social withdrawal, typically do far better in poorer
nations such as India, Nigeria and Colombia than
in Denmark, England and the United States. The
astounding result calls into question one of the
central tenets of modern psychiatry: that a “brain
disease” such as schizophrenia is best treated by
hospitals, drugs and biomedical interventions. (n.p.)
In 1992, The World Health Organization
concluded that living in a developed nation was a “strong
predictor” that the patient would never fully recover
(Jablensky et al., 1992). The better outcome in poorer
countries was explained by stronger family ties, which
have a profound impact on recovery, and the lack of
neuroleptic medication available in developed nations.
Vedantam (2005) observed that
most people with schizophrenia in India live with
their families or in other social networks—in sharp
contrast to the United States, where most patients
are homeless, in group homes or on their own, in
psychiatric facilities or in jail. Many Indian patients
are given low-stress jobs by a culture that values
social connectedness over productivity; patients in
the United States are usually excluded from regular
workplaces. Indian families sit in on doctor-patient
discussions because families are considered central
to the problem and the solution. In America,
doctor-patient conversations are confidential—and
psychiatrists primarily focus on brain chemistry….
“Social factors play a major and important role in
the outcome of disease,” Sartorius, head of the study,
said. “Very few solutions are medical in medicine.”
… “Social factors are more important than my
drug,” said Jose Bertolote, a WHO psychiatrist.
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Indian psychiatrists, unlike their Western
counterparts, dispense not only drugs but also spiritual
advice, family counseling, and even matchmaking
services. In the south Indian city of Chennai,
psychiatrist Shantha Kamath writes prescriptions for
better family ties: When a father asked for her help
in arranging the marriage of his daughter, who had
schizophrenia, Kamath’s written instructions told
the parents how to interact with their daughter and
listed the skills the young woman needed to learn
before the doctor would arrange a match. (n.p.)
In country after country, WHO found
that strong social and family connections trumped
pharmacology (Leff, 1992).
Dr. Narendra Wig’s psychiatric hospital in the
northern Indian city of Chandigarh could not afford to
pay nurses (Vedantam, 2005). Out of necessity, families
stayed with patients 24 hours a day. Relatives became the
nurses, which turned out to be more effective than nurses
(especially at calming agitated patients) and persists today. In
India, odd behavior is no reason to isolate someone. Patients
with a schizophrenia diagnosis worked, got married, and
had children. Relatives and neighbors helped and people
got better. Wig (2004) was described as mostly telling his
patients about religious figures who overcame obstacles in
a kind of naturalistic narrative therapy. He never described
schizophrenia as a chronic, incurable brain disease. He
encouraged patients to complement his treatment with
faith-healing techniques. Social connectedness for patients
is seen as so important that the psychiatrists tell families
to secretly give money to employers so that patients can be
given fake jobs, work regular hours and have the satisfaction
of getting “paid”—practices that would be unethical, even
illegal, in the United States.
Since 1970s it has been known that the
neuroscience findings in what is called “schizophrenia”
are largely overlapping with the neuroscience findings
found in states of chronic stress, childhood maltreatment
(sexual, physical and emotional abuse or neglect),
social isolation, and social defeat. The developmental
traumatology research convincingly demonstrates
causality beyond correlation of the effects of relational
traumas and chronic, profound stress on the nervous
system, which is something the proponents of “psychosis”
as a neurobiological condition have failed to do.
In support of this position, two NIMH
researchers wrote that,
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Schizophrenia, of course, is not something someone
has; it is a diagnosis someone is given. It is worth
considering that the syndrome of schizophrenia
is not a disease at all, but a state of brain function
based on an altered developmental trajectory from
early programming with changing repercussions
throughout life...That there appear to be numerous
genetic and environmental factors that can contribute
in various combinations to this recognizable state of
altered brain function further suggests that what we
call schizophrenia may represent “not the result of
a discrete event or illness process at all, but rather
one end of the developmental spectrum that for
genetic and other reasons approximately 0.5% of
the population will fall into.” (Weinberger & Levitt,
2011, p. 408)
This shift in thinking opens up the possibilities and
the necessities for new thinking about psychosis and
validates the importance of the investigation of the
phenomenology of the experience.
Phenomenology of Psychosis
e are approaching the conceptualization of
psychosis and other unusual states of mind
from a phenomenological perspective. Phenomenology
attempts to describe and explore the reported experiences
of others. What is it like for that person? How is his or
her psychosis experienced? We want to understand these
experiences in their naturally occurring complexity and
wholeness (Rhodes & Jakes, 2009). Two topics within
phenomenology are particularly salient. The first is the
understanding of the self and sense of agency, and the
description of who the agent might be. The second is the
experience of the everyday world within the agents’ lives.
In our work, we are also concerned with the being of
the other—of the being behind a voice or the being of a
vision and are seeking a description of these beings and
the worlds in which they live.
Laing (1960) described the sense of discomfort
in the world experienced by those with psychosis and
labeled it “ontological insecurity.” He believed that
people who experience psychosis never adequately
developed a secure sense of self. Perhaps the insecurity
relates more to the recognition of the spaces between
moments of consciousness and the relative arbitrariness
of which world comes into our focus. When one
grants full ontological status to the voices inside their
head, there is a way in which one can never go back to
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being the in-control character. Rather, that which one
recognizes as “me,” the being constructed to be one’s
identity, mediates among the other characters who come
to occupy the territory of the mind. For people who
have been traumatized, some of these characters can be
terrifying, occupying spaces and worlds emphasizing fear
and danger. When minds intersect with these spaces,
ontological insecurity is inevitable.
Behind the symptoms of psychosis there is a
felt sense of change by the individual, an alteration of
the experience of self, self with others, and self in the
world, which is a persistent and profound concern for
the individual (Rhodes & Jakes, 2009). This probing
of emic perspective is based on accounts of individuals
experiencing psychosis, people who relate their
experience of not feeling like themselves anymore. They
cannot act or talk to others as they used to. They are not
the same person, as if the main character in their lives
was usurped of identity in various degrees. They are no
longer grounded in the ordinary consensual world in
the same way as others, who must work hard through
spiritual practices and other means to obtain similar
visions that come quickly and easily to those diagnosed
with psychosis. On the other hand, this slower
approach seems to be associated with more positive
experiences that are enhancing to lives in the ordinary
world, while people with psychosis who are on the fast
track to visions more often appear to have negative
experiences.
Psychotherapy of Psychosis
he psychotherapy of psychosis involves, then,
using an equitable dialogical approach to create
a healing story in the tradition of White and Epston
(1990) in which the terrifying characters and emotions
are contained and managed. We aim to help people
settle into a lived world in a more syntonic manner.
People with psychosis can learn to function better in
this ordinary world even as they perceive and interact
with extraordinary worlds. In this way, we externalize
the problem and revise the person’s relationships with the
problem. In our work with narrative, which we accept
as the framework for meaning-making, we believe
we enhance their frontal lobe function, those areas
concerned with story, so that people become better able
to error detect, do theory of mind (of others), inhibit
extraneous responses (orbitofrontal cortex), and predict
consequences. Building better stories means building
better judgment.
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Oft described, though difficult to put into words,
are a wide range of alterations in perception of things,
time, and space (Rhodes & Jakes, 2009) that come to
those with psychosis and may be explainable by Penrose
and Hameroff’s theories of consciousness. Being in the
world seems different to those experiencing psychosis.
Rules inherent to those grounded in reality are not so
apparent. In our approach, we accept unquestioningly
the reality of people’s lived experience, even as we
focus on how to have extraordinary experiences and
still function in the ordinary world. We try to restore
the lost or shaken natural attitude, common sense, or
what Minkowski (1927) called the “vital contact with
reality,” so that life can happen more seamlessly (Sass,
2001). Rhodes and Gipps (2008) have described this
alteration in perception as a “background” disturbance.
Individuals with psychosis experience the surrounding
world differently, whether temporary or permanent,
specific or global in scope (Rhodes & Jakes, 2009).
This perspective on psychosis is compatible with
many indigenous cultures. Health care providers and
institutions supporting their work have a predominately
etic perspective of psychosis because they are not
experiencing it. An emic perspective of psychosis is
harder to attain and even more difficult to deliver. One
has to be willing to enter into the lived experience of the
client and grant it validity. There can often be confusion
generated because of differences of experience between
those helping and those in need of help.
Outcome research is somewhat limited.
Okuzawa et al. (2014) reviewed studies on cognitivebehavior therapy for people at high risk for psychosis
and found six qualifying studies with a total of 800
participants. Three trials achieved a significant effect.
The two trials that employed cognitive behavior therapy
enhanced for the specialized needs of clinical high-risk
patients maintained significant effects at post-treatment
follow up. They concluded that “evidence from recent
trials suggest that cognitive behavior therapy may be
beneficial in delaying or preventing onset of psychosis in
clinical high-risk individuals.
Treatment Philosophy.
Our philosophy of approach follows that of
Rhodes & Jakes (2009) with the following features:
Focus on solutions, resources, and strengths of the
individual
• Prefer solutions generated by clients with respect for
•
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their inherent creativity
Investigate unique outcomes and exceptions to the
client’s illness story
• Assume that the individual exists in a network of influences, both historical and contextual
• Use non-technical terms for difficulties
• Emphasize language, metaphor, narration, and discourse
• Be open to theories such as: neurology, phenomenology, developmental theory etc., but also the theories
of indigenous people and of the clients themselves.
• Focus on constructing together a healing narrative.
• Make little to no attempt to educate
• Use the imagination to build a full picture of a preferred future
• Combine assessment and intervention into one process
• Maintain a holistic model of causation
• Radical acceptance of the contents of the psychosis
experience, such that mitigating ideas are presented
in a way consistent with the metaphors being offered.
•

We applied these narrative practices in a locked
inpatient psychiatric facility (Mehl-Madrona, 2005)
applying concepts from Vassallo’s (1998) case report
of a narrative group for seriously mental ill, seeking to
challenge “normalizing judgments,” defined as practices
that evaluate and classify people and relationships
according to the truths of a dominant culture. In this case,
the dominant culture is the psychiatric establishment
and the day-to-day practice of categorizing people,
labeling the manner of their defect, and then providing
specific biological therapies (medications) in accordance
with current pharmacological theories about what would
work for this particular defect in biology and genetics.
Working with Anthony’s (1993) ideas of
recovery, we conducted groups from the perspective that
people can improve without professional help and that
professionals do not necessarily hold the key to recovery.
The individuals do. We believed that a common
denominator of recovery is the presence of people who
expect recovery with confidence as they bear witness to
the suffering of the individual. Community is a more
than adequate substitute for the mental health system.
In the group we challenged the dominant cultural story
of people’s brains being defectiveness as the cause of their
chronic mental illness. Implementation of our approach
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improved outcomes compared to other units in the
hospital that continued to function in the conventional
manner. We wanted to make some progress in moving
from an expert driven model (implicit in everything
about how hospitals function) to co-constructed models
arising from all concerned with the person who suffers.
What we are doing is making story together,
which is how we construct shared meanings. We create
and maintain our stories about how things work and
what they mean in dialogue with others. Through our
relationships and the stories told in those relationships,
we also construct and maintain an identity (which is
a story about who we are), which has more or less of a
sense of personal agency. Shotter (1993) has called this
dialogical or conversational social constructionism,
which is the idea that we co-create each other through
our responsive understanding and the communication of
that understanding to each other. Hence, in our work
with psychosis, we are trying to create an accepting
community of mutual understanding and influencing of
each other’s stories in which all utterances have validity,
regardless of how fantastic (or boring) some may be.
Diminishing the Expert and Peer Helping
We aimed to diminish the role of the professional
as expert. Though an event occurs, the meaning attributed
to the event is salient, since meaning is constructed by
all participants in the event. The expert paradigm can be
appropriate to certain degrees and offer benefit. However,
the implicit power differential between expert provider
and recipient of care in the patient position can leave the
patient’s perspective marginalized, and can inure the care
provider to the importance of the relationship with the
patient and to the validity of lived experience. This can
seriously impede socialization and recovery for the person
diagnosed with psychosis. Additionally, the care provider’s
constructions of reality are offered more credence, which
can be ontologically dangerous.
When the expert model becomes more flexible
and allows other stakeholders, primarily the patient, to
have a voice, the patient and the healthcare system can
benefit. Hermeneutics and dialectics are ways to allow
more and varied stakeholders into the system (Heppner,
Wampold, & Kivlighan, 2008). Hermeneutics refers to
the activity of discovery and interpretation of individual
human thought. This method is vital in developing
an interpretation of the experience of someone with
psychosis, and moves us toward a helping and healing
relationship. The interaction between caregiver and

patient can be described as dialectical. Dialectics are
expressed and developed through conversation with the
patient, and with the sharing of interpretations of the
patient’s experience once rapport has been established. The
power of dialectics emerges as our mutual understanding
changes as we share our interpretation of conversations
in which all stakeholders participate. In the dialectical
relationship, the patient is given credit for being a human
with rights of autonomy, active in creating his or her own
new experience. This differs from the expert medical
model, which can be characterized as a mostly linear flow
of information and power, in being a relationship that is
recursive and engaging of both parties.
In conventional psychiatry, illness is “discovered”
by experts through documentation of a certain number
of symptoms that can be theoretically, objectively
verified or falsified. These definitions are codified within
the DSM (APA, 2000). A radically different approach,
which would be non-hierarchical, can be derived from
philosophers such as Bakhtin (Clark & Holquist,
1984), Volosinov (Shotter, 2004) and Medvedev (The
Bakhtin Center, 2004), all of whom tried to account for
human behavior socially: by looking at how individuals
relate when communicating. For them, dialogue is the
medium whereby people create and sustain their ways
of living together—the glue for co-existing. For them,
psychosis would arise through sustained patterns of
communication. In our view, voices encountered are
also part of that dialogue and should participate in the
meaning-making about themselves.
The terminology of conventional psychiatry
(including the wording of the diagnostic criteria for
psychosis), and the operations defined as treatment, gives
the clinician privilege and authority in making decisions
about the patient. It is up to the clinician to determine
what is clinically significant, what questions to ask,
what stressors to consider, and what areas to explore,
leaving the patient with a prescription for medication
and behavior, and rarely engaging him or her in a
problem-solving dialogue. Foucault (1969) wrote about
the means by which languages of knowledge legitimatize
the consolidation of power in one group (psychiatrists)
over another group (patients), with the smaller group
explaining and defining the larger group’s reality.
Richard Bernstein (1985) wrote, “It is our
cultural understanding of science, especially the physical
sciences, and the remarkable ‘success’ of the scientific
enterprise since its modern origins that has set the context
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for the intellectual and cultural problems in the modern
world…there are deep cultural reasons and causes—as
Gadamer, Arendt, and Habermas have argued—why in
the modern world the only concept of reason that seems
to make sense is one in which we think of reason as an
instrument for determining the most efficient or effective
means to a determinate end, and why the only concept of
activity that seems viable is one of technical application,
manipulation, and control” (p. 46). This appears to
explain the motivation driving contemporary psychiatry.
However, as Whitaker (2011) pointed out, that approach
is not actually working very well.
Carving out the Continual Conversation
In Bakhtin’s perspective, humans live in
continual conversation (including internal conversations)
with actual or anticipated others. In our conversations
we are continually negotiating what we mean. The
signs and symptoms labeled psychosis result from these
conversations, perhaps even as misunderstandings.
Mikhail Bakhtin’s philosophical orientation concerning
dialogue and difference is captured in a methodological
application called “dialogism,” which offers a significant
challenge to contemporary medical practice and its
location within authoritative discourse (White, 2014).
According to Bakhtin, dialogue, as an antidote to
monologism generates difference and, as a consequence,
has the potential to expand the capacity to cross cultural
and individual borders in a process called transgression
(Holquist, 2009)
Bakhtin’s optimistic view (White, 2014)
rendered each human being into an author who works
hard all the time at co-authoring with others to have
good relationships. Psychosis in its most symptomatic
form could be seen as a breakdown in co-authorship.
The person in a psychotic state loses the ability to draw
on words and ways of speaking (discourses) to make
sense to others, to make requests of others, to repair
disrupted conversations, and so on. But, thinkers like
Bakhtin would see the psychotic conversation, even
as monologue, as valid and important. This makes
conversation an infinite challenge. A conversational view
of psychosis would argue that pharmacotherapy is one
type of conversation, but there are others. The question
of which conversation to hear would move toward issues
of practicality and preference.
The project of modern medicine is to have
complete, correct knowledge of disease (defined as
physiological and within individual biological entities), to
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have evidence-based best treatment recommendations,
and, in essence, to tell people what to do to get healthy
and stay healthy. This is also the goal of most of
alternative medicine, though the methods differ. The
larger question which some would like to consider, is the
question of whether or not this is possible. Within what
is coming to be called narrative medicine, it is possible to
inquire about the long-term socio-cultural and biological
effects of applying the biomedical expert model, and
about whether or not biology exists independent of
culture. Within the conventional psychiatric model,
culture is an add-on, an after-thought, something to
be addressed once the biological factors have been
considered and addressed. It may also be that culture
drives biology and biology shapes culture so much that
the two are inseparable.
Does the American Psychiatric Association’s
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual add anything to
contemporary mental health treatment? Recently
Thomas Insel (2013), Director of the National Institute
of Mental Health, rejected the DSM as a stand-alone
valid classification tool, since it has no grounding in
biology. However, it is culturally created and creative of
culture. With its continual “further specification” and
“fine-tuning” of diagnostic criteria, it aims to classify
people into finer and finer distinctions. Many agree
that it justifies and perpetuates a massive and powerful
industry, which perpetually revises itself. Someone from
another culture or theoretical, diagnostic system might
argue that this massive investment in the classification
of disorders produces and reifies the problems that it sets
out to study. These people might say of DSM what Jung
(1939/1966) said of Freud, that Freud (and, arguably, the
psychiatric industry)
constantly had the clinical picture of neurosis before
the mind’s eye—the very attitude that makes people
ill and prevents them from being healthy. Anyone
who has this picture before him always sees the flaw
in everything, and however much he may struggle
against it, he must always point out what these
demonically obsessive pictures compel him to see”
(p. 45).
Rom Harre (personal communication, June 23,
2004) noted that,
Most of the people who have the gall to declare
some practice to be unscientific have a very primitive
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We would prefer to arrive at something holding
the social role of truth through consensus, and propose
that the voices stifled by contemporary psychiatry should
be included. The more voices, the better, since meaning
arises as the product of multiple voices in a continuous
dialogue that never arrives at any final conclusion. This is
what we are also proposing for the voices that exist within
the mind. Meaning is an accomplishment constructed
through communication, including the communication
with the inner voice. They have something to add to the
communication that creates meaning, as do the voices
of the community in which the sufferer finds himself
or herself. Creative understanding is an unending
process whereby dialogue creates that which is shared
and different about people. This is why many are
uncomfortable with the current biological emphasis in
psychiatry—it eliminates large blocks of voices from the
dialogue.
Alternative health practitioners, or clinicians
and communities whose theories differ from the official
version, might miss out. An alternative way of constructing
any mental disorder is by listening to so-called patients in

a way that is confident enough to co-create a different
story than the official, diagnostic version.
What happens when one operates on this
idea that all human experience is valid, including the
extraordinary? What happens when each person is
approached with respect and curiosity? Regardless of
how much difficulty a person has negotiating his or her
way through the ordinary world, their non-ordinary
experiences can be profound, potentially replete with
wisdom and guidance for others, and revealing of other
unexamined dimensions of lived experience.
Preliminary Report on Outcomes
ufficient clinical work has been done to warrant
preliminary reporting of clinical outcomes. The
report summarizes the work of two of the authors
(LMM and BJM) who have interacted over time with
51 consecutive qualifying patients diagnosed (elsewhere)
with a psychotic disorder. Patients are only included in
this reporting if they had stayed with us for at least six
months. (During this same time period, 201 patients
came who did not stay for six months of treatment.)
Diagnoses included schizophrenia, bipolar disorder with
psychotic features, psychosis not otherwise specified, and
schizoaffective disorder.
Baseline questionnaires were administered to all
participants. These consisted of the Positive and Negative
Syndrome Scale (PNSS; Kay, Fiszbein, & Opfer, 1987),
the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS; Overall &
Gorham, 1962), the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale
(Ham-D; Williams, 1988), the Montgomery-Åsberg
Depression Rating Scale (MADRS; Müller, Himmerich,
Kienzle, & Szegedi, 2003), the Clinical Global Inventory
(CGI; Guy, 1976), and the BASIS-24 (Eisen, Normand,
Belanger, Spiro, & Esch, 2004). These questionnaires
were re-administered at quarterly intervals.
Table 1 shows the diagnoses for patients who
began doing narrative therapy with the authors along
with the average length of follow-up. What is clear is
that the narrative psychotherapy of psychosis is a longterm proposition, typically measured in years rather than
weeks or months. Yet the failure rate in this sample is low
(7.8%), as is the number of patients requiring ongoing
medication (9.8%). Over 60% of patients had resolution
of symptoms without any medication, and over 20% of
patients required only low dose medication.
Table 2 shows changes occurring in some basic
outcome measures over the course of treatment. The
results clearly show that most people who stick with the
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idea of what science is. Science is not a series of
discourses arranged by deductive logic. It is a cluster
of practices at the core of which is classification of
phenomena and the making of models.
The positivist idea of “science” may have done
harm to psychology, not least because people thought
there must be “measurers,” numbers, experiments,
variables and so on, and took on statistics as a way of
meeting this “obligation.”
Even in the biological sciences, there are many
complex phenomena that cannot be reduced or
deduced down in artificial experimentation that take
out external validity factors, or as you say, there are
many uncertainties and complexities of physics.
We are wondering about alternative voices to
bring to the table of explaining human behavior.
Bakhtin was fond of Dostoevsky’s ways of bringing
forth the “voices” of his characters without giving
any voice supremacy. Bakhtin defined polyphony
as “a plurality of independent and unmerged voices
and consciousnesses” leading to multiple—if not
infinite—potential meanings depending upon whom
is participating in the creation of that meaning. One
voice (as truth) is monologue, a stifling of those
dialogic potentials.

S

approach (for whatever reason) do largely improve on
all baseline measures. However, the caveat is embodied
in the question, why do so many people not continue?
Potential answers include the reality that psychotherapy
is work and much of contemporary culture socializes
people to want quick solutions to health issues, often
in the form of a pill that does not require effort. It
may also be that the more severe cases are not able to
build sufficient rapport to persevere for six months in
psychotherapy.
Clinical Cases
onsider as an example a woman whom DSM-IVTR (APA, 2000) would classify as psychotically

C

depressed. This woman, however, interpreted her
“illness” as a sign from God that she should stop her heavy
involvement with her local church, quit employment,
retreat, and be ill for a certain period of time. Nearing
the end of her time of rest, she felt vindicated, she
wanted to talk, and she sought therapeutic help in the
form of counseling and group therapy. She did not
want to discuss the symptoms in any great detail, and
was more interested in finding out how other people
experienced her in an interpersonal setting. She felt the
need to consult with therapeutic professionals, to talk,
and seemed to value this experience. Yet this process
did not replace or heal her withdrawal, perhaps because

Table 1. Patient diagnoses and follow-up length in narrative therapy.
DSM
Diagnosis

Total
Patients

Number with
resolved
psychotic
syptoms
on no
medications

Schizophrenia

15

7

6

1

1

12.9

Psychosis
Not Otherwise Specified

14

11

1

1

1

6.9

Bipolar affective disorder,
psychotic

8

5

1

1

1

2.1

Substance Induced
Psychotic Disorder

9

4

2

2

1

2.2

Schizoaffective Disorder,
currently psychosis

5

4

1

0

0

2.1

Number requiring
ongoing
medication

Failures

Number
resolved
with low
dose
medications

Number
requiring
ongoing
medication

Failures

Average
length of
follow-up
(years)

Table 2. Changes occurring over the course of treatment.
Total
Patients

Totals

51

31

11

5

4

PNSS

51

46.1 (31.2) to
2.6 (1.2)

51.2 (22.4) to
5.1 (3.1)

61.2 (22.4) to
51.4 (11.5)

45.1 (46.1) to
31.2 (51.2)

BPRS

51

104 (13.1) to
22.6 (2.5)

122 (24.5) to
13.1 (11.1)

54.5 (11.1) to
54.5 (11.1)

54.5 (11.1) to
115.1 (11.1)

Ham-D

51

30.1 (7.1) to
0.9 (0.7)

31.1 (24.1) to
3.4 (0.94)

31.2 (26.1) to
10.2 (3.1)

25.1 (22.2) to
22 (2.2)

MADRS

51

26.1 (31.2) to
4.9 (4.4)

26.1 (25.1) to
5.1 (2.2)

25.1 (31.1) to
21.3 (12.2)

31.1 (11.5) to
22.2 (12.5)

CGI change

51

-3.1 (2.2)

-2.2 (1.6)

-1.0 (1.2)

1.0 (1.5)

51

30.1 (31.2) to
9.4 (9.1)

26.1 (25.1) to
22.2 (13.1)

33.1 (31.2) to
22.6 (12.5)

26.1 (25.1) to
22.5 (13.1)

BASIS-24

70

Number with
resolved psychotic
syptoms on no
medications

Data Report Format:
Pre-score (SD) to
Post-score (SD)
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Number resolved
with low dose
medications
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she did not regard her actions during that period of
her life as particularly disordered. Quite the opposite,
in retrospect—whatever it was, whatever it did—it
appeared to be the right thing. Her story differed from
the conventionally accepted story. Improvement came
when God was allowed to speak and to declare what her
experience had meant and for those bearing witness to
her story to accept her interpretation.
Another woman, Betsy, presented with visions
of a big buffalo head. She saw two big horns and a huge
buffalo robe. She would climb on top of this buffalo, on
top of his head, and stand on his hump to see further than
she could see on her own. Her little sister periodically
appeared. A cousin had abused Betsy sexually when she
was ages 4 to 6, and she had come to believe that this
defined her. Her abuse stopped with the sudden death
of her brother. She felt guilty, for perhaps her brother
had died for her. This led to an uncomfortable stillness.
She could feel the hands of her brother. They felt “really
weird, hard and not cold, not supple, though looking
soft.” She knew he wasn’t there, but his hands were. His
hands were at room temperature when she had touched
him in the casket and this had disturbed her. She was
thirteen then. In the year before seeing me, she had
experienced a recurrent dream of waking up in shallow
water in the early morning with the sun overhead. She
often had dreams of breathing underwater. Something
grabbed her by the collar and pulled her out of the
water, telling her to go. She believed it was a leopardjaguar combination animal. She remembered going
back and forth, in and out of her body. She remembered
the incredible stillness of being outside her body. She
felt a bubble around her, a bubble of stillness. Then she
was one with a large ocean turtle on an expedition into
the ocean’s depths to find a sacred pearl. She practiced
breathing for this long journey in the dark with only a
few glimpses of moonlight.
When we discussed this, Betsy told me she was
from a star. She had to twist herself into uncomfortable
shapes when she came to earth to relate to people. These
shapes were not her. She had to go back to the stars to
feel her power. She remembered being at a health club
on the ocean in which the warmth of the sun passed
through the glass and the seagulls lined up outside. It
was early morning and the sun was overhead. She felt
someone grabbing her by the collar and pulling her
through the window and into the water. She rose up to
return to being a star. She felt the power within her.
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She talked about her mother dying two years
previously. She had never grieved her mother’s passing.
There had always been so much fury between them. In
her vision she saw a bear in the woods. The bear was
related to her but also separate. It was talking about
powers she didn’t have yet but could get, evolving
energies.
Improvement came when we created a dialogue
with all these internal characters from her visions and
dreams in which each spoke for itself. We used puppets
to represent these characters and placed them around
a table. Each was allowed to speak until all came to a
negotiated compromise that included the actual physical
people who also shared her life.
A third patient believed that he was cancer
embodied. His agency at causing death for others made
him feel alive. He was a burning funeral pyre, aware
that he would die, but going out in a glorious manner.
He perceived himself as having been in a great battle
and having fought valiantly, but having been mortally
wounded. He wore his wound proudly as a burning
flame, his badge of courage, his purple heart. We were
able to let the cancer speak and to allow him to negotiate
with it and with other characters who didn’t want him
to be cancer embodied to arrive at a more satisfactory
stance about his life.
In keeping with good clinical practice, I
contacted relatives, friends, former doctors, and
obtained collateral stories from these people to provide
further depth to their stories.
In these representative three stories, people have
broken free from the biological psychiatric narrative.
They spend no money on drugs. Their daily “meds”
include yoga, meditation, prayer, all embedded within
community. They have alternate stories, which would be
unnoticed by the dominant paradigm. If noticed these
stories would likely be dismissed as “quacky,” so rare
that a significant number of people would find them
unimportant and/or evidence of misdiagnosis (since
bipolar disorder is, by definition, life-long).
Discussion
om Harre (personal communication, June 23, 2004)
observed that science has two aims: to find a good
way to classify and pick out phenomena of interest, and
to find a good way to account for what is going on with
those phenomena. It is just a disciplined way of looking
at things. We propose a different way to think about
extraordinary mental phenomenon.
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When the voices heard by our clients are
dismissed as meaningless, the construction of meaning
that can be so healing is derailed. Creative understanding
is an unending process whereby dialogue creates that
which is shared and different about people. This occurs
both inside the mind and through meetings with other
minds.
These stories represent a repository of
transformation, and help for the today’s non-responders
—an alternative that has other solutions in addition to
medication or besides medication, as the case warrants.
Each individual has his or her own path to lessen suffering.
The solution develops from the affected community and
not the professional expert.
Within each of our clients, we saw their impulse
to create shared and multiple understandings even when
circumstances prohibited that. For these people, their
dialogue placed them as authors of their own stories,
narrators of their desires, and contributors to their
“truth”—while still continuously borrowing from the
words and discourses available to them to coexist with
their fellow humans. Our clients were aware that their
stories lay outside what was considered acceptable in
most cases. For them, one size did not fit all.
Bakhtin believed that
within the arena of...every utterance an intense
conflict between one’s own and another’s word is
being fought out....This happens both in the external
world but also the internal, experiential world of our
minds, in which some character inevitable disagrees
with whatever comes forth from our lips. The
immediate social situation and the broader social
milieu, both within our minds as maps of the outer
world complete with bleed throughs from other
realities and determined by the outer world, wholly
determine the structure of an utterance.” (Clark &
Holquist, 1984, p. 220)
Bakhtin reflected the state of mind within
so many of our clients’ minds—a state of war among
conflicting and competing voices.
Through dialogue that affirmed the lived
experience of people diagnosed as psychotic, people
recovered from what was called psychosis. The fact of
this recovery pushes us toward a social brain hypothesis,
that human relationships remodel and rewire the brain
more effectively than pharmacological agents.
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Endnotes

1.     These modalities including nutritional strategies,
micro-nutrient therapies, homeopathy, craniosacral
therapy, reiki, ritual and ceremony, prayer, traditional
Chinese medicine with or without acupuncture,
hypnosis, visualization, yoga, T’ai chi, exercise, chi
gong, and others.
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